
JS 44 (Rev. Case 3:03-cv-00718-BCIVITUTE) \$1100 (08/2003) Page 1 of 10

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. I. (a) PLAINTIFFS				DEFENDANTS		
ZIAD BANAT (b) County of Residence of First <u>Dallas</u> (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				POP RESTAURANTS LLC 3		
(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) R.S. Ghio, Law Office of R.S. Ghio, The Curtis Building 318 West Main Street, Suite 100, Arlington, TX 76010 Telephone Number: 817-543-2557 Facsimile Number. 817-277-2557 H. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)				Attorneys (If Kno	APR	2003 Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff
□ 1 US Government Plaintiff □ 2 US Government Defendant	X 3 Federal Question (U S Governm	nent Not a Party) enship of Parties	(For Di	eversity Cases Only) PTF of This State	DEF 1 Incorporated or of Business In of Business In	and One Box, for Defendant) PTF Principal Place
				or Subject of a	3 □ 3 Foreign Nation	□ 6 □ 6
IV. NATURE OF SUI		One Box Only) RTS	FORE	EITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl Veterans) 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits 160 Stockholders' Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property	PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers' Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury CIVIL RIGHTS 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations 444 Welfare 440 Other Civil Rights	PERSONAL INJUR 362 Personal Injury— Med Malpractice 365 Personal Injury— Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPER 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal Property Damage 385 Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITION 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence Habeas Corpus 530 General 535 Death Penalty 540 Mandamus & Oth 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition	RY 610 620 620 620 631 640	O Agriculture O Other Food & Drug Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC Liquor Laws O R R & Truck O Airline Regs O Occupational Safety/Health	□ H22 Appeal 28 USC 158 □ H23 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 ■ PROPERTY RIGHTS □ B20 Copyrights □ B30 Patent □ B40 Trademark ■ SOCIAL SECURITY □ B61 HIA (1395ff) □ B62 Black Lung (923) □ B63 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) □ B64 SSID Title XVI	□ 400 State Reapportionment □ 410 Antitrust □ 430 Banks and Banking □ 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc □ 460 Deportation □ 470 Racketeer Influenced and □ Corrupt Organizations □ 810 Selective Service □ 850 Securities/Commodities/ □ Exchange □ 875 Customer Challenge □ 12 USC 3410 □ 891 Agricultural Acts □ 892 Economic Stabilization Act □ 893 Environmental Matters □ 894 Energy Allocation Act □ 895 Freedom of □ Information Act □ 900 Appeal of Fee □ Determination Under Equal □ Access to Justice □ 950 Constitutionality of □ State Statutes □ 890 Other Statutory Actions
V. ORIGIN X 1 Original Proceeding State Court (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY) X Removed from State Court Appeal to District Judge from another district (specify) Appeal to District (specify) Magistrate Judgment						
Proceeding S VI. CAUSE OF ACTI 29 U S C § 1105, 1132 - for Bene Texas Workers' Compensation Ac VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CAS IF ANY	ON (Cite the U.S. Civil State Do not cite jurisdiction offits and Breach of Fuduciary Di t, Texas Labor Code § 451 001 CHECK IF THIS UNDER F.R.C.	ute under which you are fil nal statutes unless diversity ity under ERISA, for retali	ling and write b	rnef statement of cause		ition under the
DATE 4-8-03 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY						



PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Ziad Banat, Plaintiff herein, now files this his Original Complaint, and would show the Court as follows.

I. PARTIES

- 1. Plaintiff Ziad Banat is an individual residing within Dallas County, Texas.
- 2. Defendant POP Restaurants LLC, ("POP") a Texas corporation with its principal place of business at 7750 N. MacArthur Blvd., Suite 120-221, Irving, Texas 75063-7514. POP may be served with process by serving its registered agent for service, Richard J. Dobbyn, P.O. Box 852516, Mesquite, TX 75185-2616.

II. JURISDICTION

3. This court has original jurisdiction over the claims asserted herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 1132(a)(1), and 1140; and 29 U.S.C. § 2617.

III. VENUE

4. Venue is proper in this Court because the Defendant is a resident of Dallas County, Texas.

IV. FACTS

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- 5. Plaintiff is a former employee of POP, which owns and operates several Popeye's Chicken franchises in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. In 1998, Plaintiff was hired by POP's predecessor, AFC Enterprises, and he worked at various Popeye's locations. POP purchased several stores from AFC in December of 2001.
- 6. In May of 2002, Plaintiff was working as the store manager of Popeye's 6094, located at 1204 N. Collins in Arlington, Texas. On May 5, 2002, Plaintiff met with Brandon Elliott, a 17-year-old employee under his supervision, to inform Elliott that due to poor performance, his employment with Popeye's was being terminated. It was within the course and scope of Plaintiff's employment for Plaintiff to make termination decisions regarding his employees and to terminate employees whose performance was not acceptable.
- 6. Shortly after informing Mr. Elliott of his termination, Plaintiff was standing directly outside the store, speaking with his Area Leader, Sherry Davis, regarding a business-related matter. Plaintiff was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time. Plaintiff was unaware that Mr. Elliott had either remained outside the store, or had left and returned. Regardless, Mr. Elliott suddenly approached Plaintiff and struck him on the jaw, knocking him to the ground. Mr. Elliott continued to strike and kick Plaintiff, causing him serious injury, until Mr. Elliott was pulled away by other employees, after which the police were called.
- 7. As a result of injuries to his head, neck, and chest, Plaintiff reported to Arlington Memorial Hospital for treatment. Through its agents and/or representatives, POP informed Plaintiff as well as Arlington Memorial that POP was self-employed for

worker's compensation purposes and would directly pay for Plaintiff's treatment. Upon information and belief, this statement was false, in that Defendant was insured through a non-subscriber occupational injury indemnity policy.

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- Upon information and belief, Defendant has failed to take the steps 8. required by the Texas Worker's Compensation Act to register with the state as a nonsubscriber to the Texas Worker's Compensation Act or to inform its employees that it is a non-subscriber to the Act. At all times, Plaintiff understood that POP was a subscriber to worker's compensation and that his injury would be compensated under the provisions of the Act.
- At no time has Plaintiff ever been provided with the name and account 9. number of the carrier for the indemnity policy, nor has he been informed of how to file a claim under such policy. To the contrary, POP had Plaintiff complete a "First Report of Injury," the form used under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act, reinforcing the impression that his injury would be compensated under the Act.
- Plaintiff reported his injuries to his employer as work-related. Plaintiff 10. and POP both spoke of the injuries in terms of a "worker's compensation" claim. Plaintiff was informed by Sherry Davis on or around late August 2002 that the company was handling the claim as a worker's compensation claim.
- Despite continuing pain as a result of his injuries, Plaintiff continued to 11. work for POP, usually working the same extended hours he typically worked before the assault. His symptoms did not improve; instead, they got worse. Moreover, Plaintiff began experiencing difficulties in getting required medical tests and procedures

performed, because POP was not paying the medical bills. Plaintiff repeatedly requested that this problem be addressed, but to no avail.

- 12. On September 25, 2002, Plaintiff's doctor took him off work for a one-week period. Plaintiff called Ken Salisbury, the new Area Leader, to inform him of this development, but could not reach him by telephone. He also delivered a copy of the doctor's note to the restaurant. Plaintiff's assistant manager also called Mr. Salisbury and left a message informing him that Mr. Banat would be off work for a week and had left his doctor's note at the restaurant.
- 13. The very next morning, Mr. Salisbury arrived at Plaintiff's store, with a new management team in tow. He informed Tasha James, the assistant manager, that he was terminating the entire management staff, and he provided her with a written notice which called for the "Termination and Replacement of Mgmt. Staff." Mr. Salisbury immediately placed a new management team at the restaurant.
- 14. Despite Mr. Salisbury's statement to Ms. James that the management staff was being terminated, Mr. Salisbury did not contact Plaintiff to inform him that he was being terminated, nor did he contact Plaintiff to discuss his medical condition, his release from work, or his job status. However, upon information and belief, Mr. Salisbury changed the locks on the doors of Popeye's #6094, thus preventing Plaintiff from having access to the building. Based upon the statements and conduct of Mr. Salisbury, Plaintiff concluded that he was terminated.
- 15. The following payday, POP unlawfully refused to release Plaintiff's paycheck until Plaintiff spoke directly with Mr. Salisbury. That meeting took place days later, at which time Mr. Salisbury informed Plaintiff that in POP's view, Plaintiff had

abandoned his job, and thus resigned. This was untrue, and merely a pretext for terminating Mr. Banat because of his injury and his need for medical leave.

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16. Since Plaintiff's termination, Defendant has refused to pay any medical bills or respond to inquiries from Plaintiff's physician, including requests for essential tests and treatment. Moreover, POP has refused to provide the policy number, name, or contact information for its indemnity carrier.

IV. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION--ERISA

- 17. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-16 herein by reference as if set forth in full.
- 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant had in place a benefit plan for occupational injuries (the "Plan"), under which Plaintiff was or should have been covered. Such benefit plan was a "qualified plan" under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 *et seq*.
- 19. Defendant intentionally and willfully interfered with Plaintiff's rights under the Plan by, *inter alia*, failing to disclose the identity of the carrier or the policy number of the Plan; failing to inform Plaintiff that the Plan existed, by failing to report Plaintiff's occupational injury to the carrier, and by refusing to authorize medical treatment. Such conduct constitutes a breach of Plaintiff's fiduciary duties under the Plan, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 and violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
- 20. As a proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirements of this Court, including lost medical benefits, the inability to obtain medical treatment, and lost income benefits.

- 21. Defendant's violations of ERISA were willful and malicious, thus supporting an award of punitive damages.
- 22. In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to recover statutory penalties pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (c)(1) and (3) of \$100.00 per day from the date of the unlawful conduct.
- 23. In addition, Plaintiff has been forced to hire an attorney to pursue his rights under the Act.

V. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—FMLA RETALIATION

- 24. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-23 herein by reference as if set forth in full.
- 25. In September, 2002, Plaintiff presented Defendant with a doctor's note requiring medical leave for a serious medical condition.
- 26. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was entitled to such leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
- 27. Defendant immediately terminated Plaintiff upon receiving news of his need for such leave, in violation of the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
- 28. As a proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff suffered damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimums of this Court, including lost pay and benefits (both past and future).
- 29. Defendant acted intentionally and with malice in retaliating against Plaintiff for seeking FMLA leave, thus justifying the imposition of punitive damages.
- 30. In addition, Plaintiff has been forced to retain an attorney in order to pursue his rights under FMLA.

VI. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—RETALIATION UNDER THE TEXAS WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT

- 31. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-30 herein by reference as if set forth in full.
- 32. Plaintiff filed a good faith report of injury under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act.
- 33. Defendant terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim and for seeking a leave of absence under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act, in violation of Tex. Labor Code § 451.001.
- 34. As a proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered injury in excess of the jurisdictional minimum requirements of this Court.
- 35. Defendant's violation of the Texas Worker's Compensation Act was willful and malicious, thus supporting an award of punitive damages.
- 36. In addition, Plaintiff has been forced to retain an attorney to pursue his rights under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act.

VII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION—INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 37. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-36 herein by reference as if set forth in full.
- 38. Defendant's conduct toward Plaintiff was extreme and outrageous, and Defendant engaged in such conduct intentionally.
- 39. As a proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.

40. Defendant's conduct was willful and malicious, thus supporting an award of punitive damages.

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41. In addition, Plaintiff has been forced to retain an attorney to pursue his claims against Defendant.

VIII. PRAYER

- 42. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-41 herein by reference, as if set forth in full.
- Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his behalf and award him 43. damages, including:
 - Back pay; a.
 - b. Front pay;
 - Lost benefits, past and future; c.
 - d. Payment for medical expenses connected with Plaintiff's occupational injury;
 - Compensatory damages, including recovery for mental and e. emotional distress;
 - f. Punitive damages;
 - Statutory penalties; g.
 - Costs of Court; and h.
 - i. Reasonable and necessary attorney's fees.

IX. **JURY DEMAND**

44. Plaintiff requests a trial by jury. B Document 1 Filed 04/08/200

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment for Plaintiff as described herein, that Plaintiff be awarded actual damages, compensatory damages, costs, and attorney's fees, and that Plaintiff be awarded such additional recovery to which the Court finds him justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

R.S. Ghio

Texas State Bar No. 00787531

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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF